Abstract. In this article, we investigate the use of limited-birthday distinguishers to the context of hash functions. We rst provide a proper understanding of the limited-birthday problem and demonstrate its soundness by using a new security notion Dierential Target Collision Resistance (dTCR) that is related to the classical Target Collision Resistance (TCR) notion. We then solve an open problem and close the existing security gap by proving that the best known generic attack proposed at FSE 2010 for the limited-birthday problem is indeed the best possible method. Moreover, we show that almost all known collision attacks are in fact more than just a collision nding algorithm, since the dierence mask for the message input is usually xed. A direct and surprising corollary is that these collision attacks are interesting for cryptanalysis even when their complexity goes beyond the 2 n/2 birthday bound and up to the 2 n preimage bound, and can be used to derive distinguishers using the limited-birthday problem. Interestingly, cryptanalysts can now search for collision attacks beyond the 2 n/2 birthday bound. Finally, we describe a generic algorithm that turns a semi-free-start collision attack on a compression function (even if its complexity is beyond the birthday bound) into a distinguisher on the whole hash function when its internal state is not too wide. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst result that exploits classical semi-free-start collisions on the compression function to exhibit a weakness on the whole hash function. As an application of our ndings, we provide distinguishers on reduced or full version of several hash functions, such as RIPEMD-128, SHA-256, Whirlpool, etc.
Introduction
A hash function H is a function that takes an arbitrarily long message M as input and outputs a xed-length hash value of size n bits. Classical security requirements for a cryptographic hash function are collision resistance and (second)-preimage resistance. Namely, it should be impossible for an adversary to nd a collision (two distinct messages that lead to the same hash value) in less than 2 n/2 hash computations, or a (second)-preimage (a message hashing to a given challenge) in less than 2 n hash computations. Most standardized hash functions are based upon the Merkle-Damgård paradigm [35, 11] and iterate a compression function h with xed input and output size to handle arbitrarily long messages.
The compression function itself should ensure equivalent security properties in order for the hash function to inherit from them. When the internal state size of the compression is the same as for the hash function, then the construction is called narrow-pipe, otherwise it is called a wide-pipe.
The SHA-3 competition organized by the NIST [49] eventually ended in early October 2012 with the selection of KECCAK [16] as sole winner and new hash function standard. During the last decade, due to this competition and to the cryptanalysis breakthroughs [54, 55] that provoked this reaction from the NIST, hash functions have been among the most active topics in academic cryptography. This infatuation is justied by the fact that these primitives are utilized tremendously in practice, with applications ranging from digital signatures, message authentication codes, to secure storage of passwords databases. However, a hash function is also seen as the swiss knife of cryptography: many protocols use the random oracle paradigm [3] to check and even prove that they present no structural aw, and while there is no such thing as a random oracle, designers use hash functions to simulate its behavior. Overall, even if collision and (second)-preimage resistance are their most important security properties, cryptographers are therefore also expecting hash functions to present no structural aw whatsoever, i.e. to be indistinguishable from a random oracle. NIST, for example, clearly specied in its SHA-3 call for candidates [49] that the submitted proposals have to support randomized hashing and not present any non-random behavior.
On the cryptanalysis side, many various distinguishers have been proposed in the recent years, mainly against AES or SHA-3 candidates. One can cite for example zero-sums distinguishers [2] , rotational distinguishers [24] or subspace distinguishers [26] . Limited-birthday distinguishers have been introduced by Gilbert and Peyrin [15] as a tool to distinguish 8 rounds of the AES block cipher from an ideal permutation in the known-key model, and it was later used against other symmetric key primitives [40, 37, 13, 22] . It consists in deriving pairs of plaintext/ciphertext couples (P, C), (P , C ) (or input/output couples (M, H(M )), (M , H(M )) for a one-way function) with an input xor dierence belonging to a set IN of 2 I elements and an output xor dierence belonging to a set OU T of 2 O elements, i.e. P ⊕ P ∈ IN and C ⊕ C ∈ OU T (or M ⊕ M ∈ IN and H(M ) ⊕ H(M ) ∈ OU T ). What is the best generic attack complexity in the case of an ideal permutation (or function) ? When IN and/or OU T are big enough then this problem is equivalent to a classical birthday paradox problem (i.e. with complexity min 2 (n−O)/2 , 2 (n−I)/2 ), but the idea underlying the limited-birthday is that when IN and OU T are small an attacker might not be able to use the birthday paradox as much as he would like to. Indeed, he will have to perform several independent smaller birthday searches instead of a single big one, and therefore the process will require much more computations. Gilbert and
Peyrin [15] proposed the best known generic algorithm for the limited-birthday problem, whose complexity is max min 2
for a permutation and max 2 (n−O+1)/2 , 2 n−I−O+1 for a function 4 . However, its optimality is yet unknown and it was only conjectured that their attack is the best possible. As of today, only Nikoli¢ et al. [39] provided a formal lower bound proof, which is min 2 n/2−2 , 2 n−(I+O)−3 . Unfortunately this bound is not tight and only applies to permutations. For example, in the case of I = O = 0, the attack complexity in [15] is 2 n−I−O+1 = 2 n+1 while the proven bound in [39] only reaches 2 n/2−2 .
Some might argue that the limited-birthday problem can trivially be solved by choosing a random input pair (X, Y ) and computing IN = {X ⊕ Y } and OU T = {H(X) ⊕ H(Y )}. However, these pathological attackers, that we call cheating adversaries, are meaningless: since hash functions are not processing any secret and are completely public (unlike other primitives in cryptography), formalizing security notions requires some kind of challenge, in order to avoid these cheating adversaries (the same is true concerning the chosen-key model for block ciphers). For example, there always exists an adversary that can output a collision with a single operation and negligible memory (i.e. the adversary that just prints a known collision). In general, this obstacle is avoided by considering that a hash function is part of a family indexed by a key input (for example its Initial Value (IV)), or by formalizing the human ignorance [43] . These pathological cases of cheating adversaries are present for all distinguishers without challenges, even for the subspace distinguisher for hash functions [26] or q-multicollisions for block ciphers in the chosen-key model [5] .
Our contributions. To start, we provide in Section 2.1 a proper understanding of limited-birthday distinguishers for the hash function setting. Namely, we discuss potential issues arising from security notions for a public function without challenge and describe various tricks to avoid pathological cheating adversaries.
We also show that limited-birthday distinguishers for hash functions can be used to attack a security notion very similar to the classical Target Collision Resistance (TCR) property, which we call dierential Target Collision Resistance (dTCR).
Secondly, we provide in Section 2.2 a proof that the currently best known generic attack for the limited-birthday problem (proposed by Gilbert and Peyrin at FSE 2010 [15] ) is indeed the best possible. More precisely, we show that the 4 There is obviously a trade-o between the complexity and the success probability, which here is about 0.63. The original paper [15] missed`+1's in the exponents, which was rstly corrected by [37] computation complexity to solve the limited-birthday problem is bounded by max 2 (n−O+1)/2 , 2 n−I−O+1 . We can directly conclude that if for a collision attack (i.e., O = 0) the set IN of possible message dierence of the hash function is limited to one or a few elements regardless of the randomization input, then one can obtain a limited-birthday distinguisher on the function, even with a complexity well beyond the birthday bound. It is to be noted that this condition on the message dierence mask is veried for almost all known collision attacks, as for example with the recent advances on SHA-1 [54] . Overall, most known hash function collision attacks are in fact more then just collision nding algorithms since the message dierence mask is constrained and, as a consequence, they are now surprisingly becoming interesting even with a complexity beyond the 2 n/2 birthday bound. Our work indicates that concerning distinguishing attacks the security of many hash functions needs to be reevaluated accordingly.
We then move to the case of a compression function, naturally easier to break than the whole hash function. Namely, we provide in Section 3 a generic algorithm that can transform a semi-free-start collision attack on the compression function into a limited-birthday distinguisher for the entire hash function. Because it is based on a meet-in-the-middle approach, this algorithm gets more interesting for the attacker as the internal state of the hash function gets narrower.
To the best of the authors knowledge, this conversion is the rst result turning a classical semi-free-start collision attack on the compression function into some weakness on the whole hash function (a previous work from Leurent [28] also provides such a conversion, but it is only applicable in the very uncommon case where the average semi-free-start collisions cost is lower than a single operation). are actually dened at the end of the attack). It is to be noted that such issues already exist in the case of collision resistance and actually for any security denition regarding a public function with an adversary that is not challenged whatsoever.
Let's come back to our collision resistance case for example. Security engineers obviously understand that collision is an important security denition, but for theoreticians collision is nothing more than a certain output dierence ∆ which is equal to zero. Collision resistance therefore belongs to a more generic problem that we could name di(∆) and which asks for the adversary to exhibit 
Similarly, one can design cheating adversaries for the recent q-multicollision problem [5] used on AES: dene the problem q-multi-di(∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ q ) that asks for the attacker to exhibit q input pairs (
Then the q-multicollision problem is nothing else than q-multi-di(0, . . . , 0) with a predened δ, yet obvious cheating adversaries exist for q-multi-di: just pick q random input pairs
The same reasoning applies to the subspace distinguishers [26] as well.
As a direct analogy, the limited-birthday problem LBP(I N, OU T ) with fully dened sets IN and OU T belongs to the more general limited-birthday problem LBP. Thus, the limited-birthday distinguishers are as valid as collision, qmulticollision or subspace distinguishers when the sets IN and OU T are fully dened, and we emphasize that in the rest of the article the sets IN and OU T are considered to be fully dened before the attacker starts to actually search for a valid pair of inputs. Yet, in addition, we propose below some solutions to overcome any potential cheating adversaries.
Challenging the adversary. There are several cryptographic protocols that allow users to provide some tweak to a function H. The tweak, T , plays the role of enhancing the security, i.e., the attacker cannot obtain the target function H T until the tweak value is determined. The limited-birthday distinguisher is particularly useful for evaluating such a tweakable function H T . One of such protocols is the randomized hashing [50] , where a message to be signed with a digital signature scheme is hashed after a tweak is applied in order to enhance the security against forgery attacks. Let us rst recall the security notion called target collision resistance [4] . An n-bit tweakable function H T is said to be target collision resistant if it is computationally hard to perform the following attack.
Target Collision Resistance (TCR) 1. The adversary chooses an input value I after some precomputation. 2. The value of T is chosen without any control by the adversary.
The adversary nds an input value
The TCR notion is a base of the provable security of the randomized hashing scheme 5 . In the SHA-3 competition, NIST required the submitted algorithms to provide n bits of security for the randomized hashing scheme [49, Section 4.A].
We then slightly modify the TCR notion as follows. 6 Dierential Target Collision Resistance (dTCR) 1. The adversary chooses an input dierence ∆ after some precomputation. 2. The value of T is chosen without any control by the adversary.
The adversary nds an input value I such that H T (I) = H T (I ⊕ ∆).
Let the tweak T be a choice of a part of the algorithm design such as constant values, Sboxes, and IV. For such a tweak, a dierential attack can usually choose IN and OU T independently of T . Therefore, for such a tweak, a limited-birthday distinguisher for the hash function setting with |IN | = 1, OU T = {0}, and with a complexity below 2 n , is an attack on the dTCR notion. In section 4, we will show several applications to real-world hash functions that satisfy those properties against the tweaking method of the randomized hashing. We believe that the impact of limited-birthday distinguishers is much bigger than just identifying a non-random behavior as several other distinguishers do.
In the case of iterative hash functions, a very simple tweak can even be considered: randomizing the rst message block M 1 . The attacker is challenged to exhibit a non-random property on the function and with M 1 as prex chosen by the challenger, i.e. every message queried or used must contain message block M 1 as prex. In fact, the randomized hashing gives a tweak by choosing a random string r, and processing r as a prex and then XORing r to each input message block. Because a challenge is asked to the attacker preliminarily, no cheating 5 Strictly speaking, security of the randomized hashing scheme is based on the eTCR notion [18] , for which the adversary nds input values (T , I ⊕ ∆) such that
Step 3 of the denition of TCR. Note that breaking TCR immediately leads to breaking eTCR. 6 The two notions are similar, yet we leave as open problem the question regarding any formal link between them.
adversary exists in this setting. Moreover, many dierential attacks can nd IN and OU T independently of the tweak value.
Note also that it is important for the tweak set size to be big enough, in order to avoid any adversary that would precompute cheating behavior for any tweak value.
2.2 The limited-birthday problem for hash functions Denition 1 (The limited-birthday problem). Let H be an n-bit output hash function, that can be randomized by some input (IV or tweak or etc.) and that processes input messages of xed size, m bits where m ≥ n. Let IN be a set of admissible input dierences and OU T be a set of admissible output dierences, with the property that IN and OU T are closed sets with respect to ⊕. Then, for the limited-birthday problem, the goal of the adversary is to generate a message
A generic procedure to solve the limited-birthday problem in [15] is described below. We denote by active (resp. inactive) the input bits for which the xor dierence can be chosen by the attacker (resp. cannot be chosen by the attacker).
Its illustration is given in Figure A1 in Appendix.
1. Choose a random value for the inactive bits. 3. If a pair whose output dierence is included in OU T is found, abort the procedure. Otherwise, go back to Step 1 and choose another random value for the inactive bits.
Step 2 is enough.
Theorem 1. The limited-birthday attack complexity in [15] for a one-way function is
where I and O are dened by |IN | = 2
If |IN | is small, the complexity is 2 n−I−O+1 . However, even if |IN | is very big, the complexity cannot be below 2 n−O+1 2
. Thus, the complexity is the maximum of these two cases. It was conjectured that the above attack procedure is the best possible. Then, based on this conjecture, presenting for a real hash function an attack which is faster than Eq. (1) was regarded as a non-ideal behavior and many results have been published in this context [15, 40, 13, 22] . We close an open problem by proving below the optimality of the above generic limited-birthday attack.
Theorem 2. The lower bound of the number of queries for the limited-birthday distinguisher matches Eq. (1).
Proof. Let U be the attack complexity, i.e. the number of queries for the limitedbirthday distinguisher. In the case of 2
since, in this case, the situation is equivalent to the ordinary birthday attack.
Hence, it is sucient to prove that U ≥ 2 n−I−O+1 in the case of 2
First, let I := {1, 2, . . . , 2 n−I } and O := {1, 2, . . . , 2 n−O } represent the sets of inactive bits in inputs and outputs, respectively, and x a set of queries by the limited-birthday distinguisher arbitrarily. According to this set of queries, a bipartite graph G := (I, O, E) can be dened as shown in Figure 1 , where I and O are partite sets and E is the edge set. In the bipartite graph G, each edge e := (i, j) ∈ E, i ∈ I, j ∈ O, corresponds to a query with an inactive bit i ∈ I and its output j ∈ O. Due to this correspondence, the bipartite graph G allows multiedges which share the same end vertices. The pair of queries satisfying limited-birthday collision corresponds to the multiedges, which we are going to nd.
Hereafter, we call a pair of edges which share the same vertex in I (but no constraint for the other end vertex in O) as a valid pair. Because, for each edge, the end vertex belonging to O is chosen according to the uniform distribution, the probability that a randomly chosen valid pair is a solution for the limitedbirthday problem is 2 −(n−O) . Therefore, the total number of valid pairs, denoted by V , should be greater than or equal to 2 n−O in order to obtain a solution for the limited-birthday problem with a good probability.
For i ∈ I, let d i be the degree of the vertex i, which is the number of edges connected to the vertex i. It is obvious that d i is no more than 2 I , and the number of valid pairs incident with the vertex i is di 2
. Hence, the total number V of valid pairs can be expressed as 
Here, we also note that the above (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d 2 n−I ) is determined by the set of queries by the distinguisher, namely, it can represent arbitrary attack strategy including the limited-birthday attack proposed in [15] . Hence, the best possible attack can be obtained by maximizing the total number of valid pairs V . In order to maximize V in Eq. (2) under the constraints Eq. (3), theory of majorization is useful [30] : for real valued -dimensional vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ) ∈ R and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y ) ∈ R arranged as decreasing order, i.e. x 1 ≥ x 2 ≥ · · · ≥ x and y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y , we say that y is majorized by x, in symbols x y, if they satisfy
We note that a function f : R → R is said to be Schur-convex if f (x) ≥ f (y) is satised for all x, y ∈ R with x y. It is well known 7 that a function i=1 x k i is Schur-convex on R + for any k > 1.
Based on theory of majorization, the vector
attains the maximum value of V under the constraints of Eq. (3). To see this, it is sucient to check that the vector D * majorizes all vectors satisfying Eq. (3), and the fact that the function n i=1 x 2 i is Schur-convex. Hence, substituting Eq.
(4) into (3), we can upper-bound V as
As we have already seen, V ≥ 2 n−O is necessary in order to nd a limitedbirthday collision with suciently high probability. Combining this inequality with Eq. (5), we obtain U ≥ 2 n−I−O+1 , which completes the proof.
Remarks
The proof in Section 2.2 can be extended to the lower bound of the query complexity for the 4-sum, or in general the k-sum problem, with pre-specied admissible dierence sets IN . Here, the k-sum problem nds k distinct input values where the xor sum of their output values is 0. It is already known that 7 For instance, this fact is immediately recognized from [30, C.1. Proposition] which states that i g(xi) is Schur convex if g(x) is convex. Obviously, g(x) = x k , x ≥ 0, is convex for any k > 1. 8 We roughly assume that U is a power of 2.
several signature schemes [52] and several instantiations of the random oracle [29] are badly aected if an underlying hash function is vulnerable against the k-sum attack. When the degree of each input vertex is d i in Figure 1 , the number of valid k-tuples of edges that share the same input vertex is
k > 1 is Schur-convex, We can prove that D * which majorizes any other 2 n−Idimensional vectors is the optimal choice to minimize the query complexity.
Finally, it is to be noted that the reasoning of our proof is only done on the input and output set sizes. Therefore, one can use this proof even for other properties than xor dierence. When IN and/or OU T are not closed sets our proof still applies, but is not tight since the algorithm from [15] can not be utilized anymore. We leave this gap as an open problem, yet conjecturing that the attack complexity will grow rapidly as the sets gets more opened.
Generic limited-birthday distinguishers
Several previous works analyzed the complex relation between the security of a hash function and its compression function, both in a proof oriented [9] or in an attack oriented manner [41] . For example, a well known result is that a preimage attack for a compression function (also called pseudo-preimage attack) can be transformed into a preimage attack on the hash function when a narrow-pipe design is used by a meet-in-the-middle technique. In this section, we explain how an attacker can turn a semi-free-start collision attack (even when its complexity is beyond the birthday bound) into a limited-birthday distinguisher on the hash function using a meet-in-the-middle approach.
Let h be a compression function taking m bits of message and k bits of chaining variable as inputs and outputting a k-bit value. Then, let H be an n-bit hash function (with n ≤ k), that iteratively calls h to process incoming mbit message words. A semi-free-start collision is a pair ((CV, M ), (CV, M )) with M = M and such that h(CV, M ) = h(CV, M ). We assume that an attacker is able to nd 2 s distinct semi-free-start collisions for h with complexity 2 c operations (by distinct we mean that at least each CV value is dierent), with s ≤ k/2. Let IN be the set of the possible message dierence masks for all these semi-free-start collisions, and we still denote its size by |IN | = 2 (since the IV of the hash function is xed for both members of the pair and since the dierence mask zero is applied to the rst block M i ), and the limitedbirthday tells us that this should cost max 2 n/2 , 2 n−I+1 in the ideal case. Since
n/2 , this attack will lead to a valid distinguisher if and only if
One may wonder why we do not simply use a parameter x = c − s that represents the average semi-free-start collision cost instead of c and s (and then the attack complexity would simply be 2 (k+x)/2+1 ). The reason is that many semi-free-start collision attacks consume a lot of freedom degrees and often the attacker is unable to generate as many as he wants. Looking at the relation (6), one can remark that for a particular hash function (i.e. k and n are xed) and for a xed I, the attacker only has to nd the right amount of semi-free-start collisions that minimizes 2 c + 2 k−s . Also, in the best case where a semi-freestart collision costs a single operation on average (i.e. c = s), the best for him is to generate as many semi-free-start collisions as he can (up to 2 k/2 ). More generally, the cheaper are the semi-free-start collisions to generate, the closer the distinguisher will be to the 2 k/2 birthday bound. Conversely, the more expensive are semi-free-start collisions to generate, the closer the distinguisher will be to the 2 k internal preimage bound. Finally, because of its meet-in-the-middle nature, it is only natural that the complexity of the attack reduces when the size of the hash function internal pipe decreases. For hash candidates with double-pipe and more (k ≥ 2n), our algorithm will never lead to a valid distinguisher, which is yet another argument indicating that having at least a double-pipe for a hash function increases its security.
It is to be noted that the very same reasoning can be applied even if the semi-free-start collision attack requires several message blocks in order to be performed. Moreover, one can even further generalize by looking at semi-free-start near-collision attacks, that is nding a pair ((CV, M ), (CV, M )) with M = M and such that h(CV, M ) h(CV, M ). However, near collisions (unlike real 9 If the cost for generating each semi-free-start collision is 1, the matching process becomes the balanced meet-in-the-middle, and thus a memoryless attack might be possible with a cycle method. However, in order to construct the cycle, one must dene how to make the feed for the next computation and the feasibility will depend on the details of the semi-free-start collision attack.
collisions) do not propagate when adding extra message blocks in the hash computation chain. Therefore, in order to use semi-free-start near-collision attacks, it is necessary that they have to be able to include the hash padding inside the last message block. Then, the only eect compared with previous reasoning will be that |OU T | will be slightly larger than 1.
This method shows that semi-free-start collisions on a compression function are directly meaningful even for the hash function security itself. Even better, cryptanalyst might now be interested in nding semi-free-start collision attacks beyond the birthday bound, in order to derive distinguishers on the entire hash function. Previously, Leurent [28] also used a meet-in-the-middle technique on
Skein [14] to turn semi-free-start collisions into a collision on the whole hash, but his method is only applicable in the uncommon situation where the average cost of the semi-free-start collisions is strictly lower than 1 (in his article 2 70 semi-free-start collisions can be generated with 2
operations).
Finally, one may argue that distinguishers from a random oracle already existed for classical iterative hash functions with a rather narrow-pipe, for example by using the very simple and well known length extension attack (for all Z, from
However, such issues do not exist anymore for strengthen constructions like the ones proposed by Coron et al. [9] . For example, utilizing a HMAC-like construction (like it is done in the LANE hash function [20] ) prevents the length extension attack, while our limited-birthday distinguishing attack would remain perfectly valid.
Applications
In this section, we show a few application examples of our generic hash function limited-birthday distinguisher from compression function semi-free-start collisions. While some of the results we will present here are quite interesting such as the rst result on the full LANE hash function and improved results on RIPEMD-128 and Whirlpool, some other do not reach the full number of rounds or do not really improve over known distinguishers. However, we emphasize that due to the tremendous work required to analyze the collision resistance of a compression function, we mostly based our application examples on known semi-free-start collision attacks. Therefore, since beyond-birthday complexity semi-free-start collisions were not searched for so far, we expect that several of our results can be improved by allowing this extra complexity cost.
We summarize our distinguishers in Table 1 . The limited-birthday distinguisher on the hash function with |IN | = 1, OU T = {0} can be used to attack the dTCR notion against the randomized hashing. Our results on HAS-160, RIPEMD-128, and SHA-256 are the cases. 
Reduced-round AES-based hash functions
AES-128 [10] is a 128-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys and the NIST's current block cipher standard. It is composed of 10 rounds (in the last round, the linear diusion layer is removed) and many recent hash functions got inspired by this design. Classic ways to securely turn a block cipher E into a compression function h are known for a long time e.g., the Davies-Meyer mode
Concretely, we will consider compression functions built upon AES-128 in these two modes, and placed into a Merkle-Damgård domain extension to obtain the hash function. This was actually a proposal by Cohen [8] and the current best attack on the whole hash function is a 7-round preimage attack [44] , but with a complexity very close to the generic one. In this Section, we will consider truncated dierential paths and denote an active/inactive byte by a black/white cell.
Davies-Meyer mode: we use the following 6-round truncated dierential path: The dierential path in the key schedule can be handled independently from the internal cipher part, and the cost is very low (only 6 Sbox transitions to control 
Reduced-round HAS-160
HAS-160 is a hash function standardized by the Korean government and widely used in Korea [48] . Its structure is similar to SHA-1. It adopts the narrowpipe Merkle-Damgård structure, and produces 160 bits digests. The compression function consists of 80 steps.
Although a distinguisher on the full compression function is known [45] , the current best attack for the hash function is a 68-step preimage attack proposed by Hong et al. [19] , which is slightly faster than the brute force attack. For a practical complexity, a semi-free-start collision attack for 65 steps of the compression function was proposed by Mendel et al. [33] .
The attack in [33] can generate a semi-free-start collision with complexity 1.
Moreover, the attack has enough amount of freedom degrees to generate many semi-free-start collisions. Using parameters n = 160, k = 160, c = 80 and s = 80, the distinguisher on the hash function can be mounted with a complexity of 2 81 compression function computations and 2 80 memory. Since the dierential mask on the message input is fully xed, we have I = 0 and the generic complexity to solve this limited-birthday instance is 2 161 computations, which validates our distinguisher.
LANE
LANE was designed by Indesteege [20] and submitted to the NIST's SHA-3 competition. Although LANE did not make it to the second round of the process, no security weakness has been discovered yet on the hash function. It adopts a narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård like structure.
The current most signicant attack on LANE is a semi-free-start collision attack on the full compression function by Matusiewicz et al. [32] and its improvement by Naya-Plasencia [36] , which generates semi-free-start collisions for By using our conversion method, this semi-free-start collision attack on the compression function can be converted into a distinguisher on the entire hash function (which tends to indicates thus it was eventually a wise move from NIST to remove this candidate from the competition). Having no strong restriction on the amount of freedom degrees, with parameters n = k = 256, c = 168 and s = 88, the complexity of our distinguisher for LANE-256 is 2 169 compression function computations and 2 88 memory. On the other hand, the semi-free-start collision attack accepts any dierence on 10 xed byte positions, which gives us I = 80. Our limited-birthday proof tells us that the complexity for an ideal function is 2 256−80+1 = 2 177 , which validates our attack.
Regarding LANE-512, by choosing parameters n = k = 512, c = 368 and s = 144, we minimize the distinguisher complexity to 2 369 computations and 2 144 memory. On the other hand, the semi-free-start collision attack accepts any dierence on 16 xed byte positions, which gives us I = 128. Our limitedbirthday theorem tells us that the complexity for an ideal function to nd this input pair is 2 512−128+1 = 2 385 , which validates our attack.
RIPEMD-128
RIPEMD-128 [12] We utilize the semi-free-start collision attack to derive a limited-birthday distinguisher. Namely, using parameters n = k = 256, c = 128 and s = 128, we obtain a distinguisher complexity of 2 129 computations and 2
128 memory (about 2 128 semi-free-start collisions need to be generated in our case, which is possible when studying the dierential path provided in [34] ). Since the dierential mask on the message input for the semi-free-start collision attack is fully xed, we have I = 0 and the generic complexity to solve this limited-birthday instance is 2 257 computations, which validates our distinguisher.
Reduced-round Whirlpool
Whirlpool [42] is a 512-bit hash function proposed by Rijmen and Barreto in 2000. which was standardized by ISO [21] and recommended by NESSIE [38] . The compression function consists of a 10-round AES-based cipher in a Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and whose key schedule also consists of AES-like rounds.
The current best attack in the hash function setting is a 6-round preimage attack by Sasaki et al. [46] . Lamberger et al. presented a 7-round near-collision attack [26] . Although it can handle the xed IV , the attack cannot satisfy the padding constraint and thus does not apply on the full hash function.
We propose a 7-round distinguisher by using our conversion method. The base of our distinguisher is a semi-free-start collision attack for 7 rounds of the Whirlpool compression function proposed by Lamberger et al. [26] 
Conclusion
In this article, we have explored the limited-birthday distinguishers for the case of hash functions. We believe that this type of distinguishers is powerful, and will provide new insights on how hash functions can simulate random oracles in practice. Surprisingly, on both the hash or the compression function, cryptanalysts can now look for collision attacks beyond the birthday bound and up to the preimage bound. Finally, our conversion algorithm is yet another argument in favor of long-pipe hash functions, which seems to be a good protection against compression function weaknesses turning into hash function weaknesses.
As future work, we leave the security proofs for the permutation case as an open problem. It would also be worth analyzing other types of distinguishers, such as the ones based on integral attacks [25] , and try to derive better lower bounds for the ideal case. Obviously, on the cryptanalysis side, it would interesting to see how far can the limited-birthday distinguishers go for high-end hash functions, and in particular to what extent can the known (semi)-free-start collision attacks be extended, by allowing the attacker a computation limit up to the preimage bound.
